"Construal level theory" and how it helps self control
The human being has the capacity to exploit dimensions through the intellect like no other animals. If the majority of living organisms have experience specialized cognitions (perceptions of the here and now), Man is able to create mental representations of objects that are distant. Thought is able to travel in time (from memories to projections of the future) but also in space: by imagining situations outside our perceptive field.
If terrestrial life has developed perceptive senses capable of surviving on a 4-dimensional interface, humans have a capacity to abstract these dimensions unequalled on the planet: they differ in particular in their modeling of time by mental imagery which includes past and future. This confers advantages (cooperation on a larger scale, creation of tools, delay of gratification, etc.) but also disadvantages (e.g. ruminating on a future event for weeks, which in the end never happens).
Inspired by these observations, we will develop in this text an article by Trope and Liberman (2010) who propose the "Theory of construal related to psychological distance". Psychological distance refers to any object/person/situation that would be perceived as distant - be it time or spatially. The theory proposes that when the object is perceived as distant, then the level of construal (representation – I will use both words in this text as a same meaning) becomes more abstract - which is associated with cognitions that take into account supra-ordinate variables. If the object is perceived as proximal, then the representations associated with it are more concrete (e.g. the size of the object, its weight, its appearance, etc.).
Let's take an example: if I ask you to imagine what your life will be like in 5 years, the information that will appear in your thoughts will probably be about imagining a job you like with interesting tasks, imagining being bored at home in your living room, picturing what your family is like at thanksgiving, etc.
If I were to ask you to imagine the same thing but in a week's time, then we can assume that the thoughts that would come to you would be about more concrete aspects of life: maybe the medical appointment you have scheduled, the fact that you have to vacuum, etc.
As suggested above, our way of constructing representations thus depends directly on the level of involvement that the latter has (close or distant). We can associate this with the fact that a high level of construal allows us to see the general/abstract/essential variables. A low level of representation is interested in the concrete application of our life and is therefore more likely to be associated with "feasibility". The first ones create an opinion based on an ideal, while the second ones concretize the choice by taking into account the reality of what is possible. It is likely that these two levels of construals interact in our decision process: what I want vs. what I can have. Therefore, a good mental navigation between these two dimensions seems important for choices: not only knowing where we want to go (high level of representation), but also what to do to reach the goal (low level of representation).
Why does it seem that our representations are naturally of a higher level when the object is distant? Probably because it allows us to model more stable and therefore more certain variables, whereas in this mode of representation the uncertainty is high. Conversely, when the distance is close, we can model more concrete variables that are relevant for short-term problem solving, in order to reach a meta goal. For example, preparing healthy meals today allows us to preserve a certain quality of life in the long run. Expressed another way: eating healthy is a high representation because it is general and therefore omits unsure details that could change over time (e.g. if scientific research suggests another type of plate is ideal for health than what is known today). The lower representation would specify what type of dish we are going to prepare for lunch, with a concrete list of ingredients.
As Trope and Liberman's paper suggests, high and low representations are not intangible: individuals switch from one mode to the other depending on the context. Individuals will use both modes of representation. Although the study does not specify this, it is also likely that biological predispositions favor processing information in one mode over the other. High-level or low-level representations are likely to have variable quality modelling depending on IQ, developmental age, presence or absence of brain damage, stressful life context, etc.
An interesting bias observed under the psychological distance variable is the correspondence bias: the tendency to attribute a person's behavior to their intrinsic dispositions rather than to the influence of the environment. Whereas for oneself, people tend to attribute the behavior as a consequence of a certain situation. To give a concrete example: if we see someone getting angry because he has lost his wallet, our representation will induce us that this person is easily angered. If we get angry for the same reason, we will prefer to justify the behavior by the context (here: losing his wallet). The authors explain that one possible reason for this bias is that we know ourselves better than we know others: this is why we prefer to attribute environmental causes to our behaviors rather than to our traits.
Another explanation could be the defense of self-esteem by trying not to attribute pejorative adjectives as traits and thus preferring environmental variables.
It is suggested that in order to have a higher level of self-representation, it may be wise to judge oneself or talk about oneself as in the 3rd person: as is often done in popular culture "I'm asking for a friend..." this creates a distance from the threat to self-esteem. It may be easier to consider behaviors to change, or to make a more insightful assessment by creating distance from the self.
It is important to choose the time scale on which we want to predict the future: if we imagine a near future, we are more likely to consider situational variables that will play a positive or negative role for the behavior we are imagining (e.g., taking a long hike). For the past, McDonald and Hirt (1997) suggest that if we try to imagine the score that a friend of ours made years ago on an exam, we will infer a score based on that person's general abilities rather than recall the actual score. This suggests that since memory is a dynamic construction process, as distance increases we will re-encode according to high-level representations rather than situational ones.
High-level representations transcend the here and now to retain essential properties of the object across distance, whereas low-level representations serve to model the present well.
Values and morals are associated with high-level representations. They generally form our guide for desires and meta-purpose in our life. Self-control would thus be facilitated when the motivation associated with the high-level representation is important. Conversely, self-control failure occurs when low-level motivations (relieving anger, stress) take over. We may value being healthy. But if we fail to distance ourselves from the present and our short-term emotions, we will more easily succumb to short-term motivations - and thus engage in immediate gratification behaviors that run counter to the value of maintaining good health. By being aware of this aspect, we can imagine that any intention to change certain habits, certain emotional responses, must be accompanied by insightful high-level representations and to integrate these representations in the face of low-level representations. Conversely, the high-level representation must understand the back and forth between these two levels of representation and accept that sometimes we may give in to low-level motivations. This avoids forming an unattainable high-level ideal (e.g., never to eat dessert again, even though we are used to it), which would then lead to blame and guilt behaviors if the low-level motivation took over.
If we want to change, it is probably also important to think carefully about our motivations and their essence: if the psychological distance of the motivation is proximal, it is likely that the behaviors towards change are too ephemeral. For example, wanting to get a good grade on exams to impress one's classmates will in most cases be a more short-term (and therefore low-level) oriented motivation than wanting to get good grades to integrate the subject well and be a professional with more knowledge during one's working life (high-level).
In summary, it is likely that levels of representation have an important role to play in motivation, and that good mental navigation between low and high level representations can be a significant key to facilitating change. This may also be an interesting point to explore further for professionals following patients in the health/prevention field.
It is important to know how to benefit from emotions to help self-control. Emotions can be characterized as equally low or high level. Pride is high level because it represents a more stable concept, whereas joy is low level (this emotion is more associated with situational reasons and as fading quickly). Thus, modeling change as being accompanied by pride can facilitate good decision making (by good we mean goal-directed), where joy will not have this effect (Eyal & Fishbach, 2008). To give an example using the example of changing to a healthier lifestyle: if we prioritize joy and are asked to choose between broccoli and chocolate ice cream, we can associate chocolate ice cream with joy. Whereas it is harder to associate it with «pride».
Like emotions, perceptual senses play a role with psychological distance. Touching an object (e.g. a smartphone) can bring a more concrete representation of how to use this object and how it could accompany us in daily life. Simply seeing the object (e.g. in a photo) does not create the same effect of proximity. Finally, the novelty vs. age effect also plays a role in how we will represent the stimuli. A new situation is associated with high-level representations, whereas an old situation is associated with low-level representations. Thus, since processing is more heuristic in the case of novelty, creativity is better. This coincides with observations on expertise that shows experts do not necessarily perform better than less experienced professionals in their field when faced with novel situations (vs old ones).
Main points I keep in mind with this paper :
The authors distinguish two levels of representation. A "high" level that serves to model abstract, stable, supra-ordered variables. A "low" level that models situational and concrete variables, but which are therefore less stable in relation to the essence of the conceptualization.
The treatment between high and low levels of representation is influenced by the psychological distance. Distance is the "where" and "when", i.e. the spatiotemporal aspects of the object. A strong distance (object in the distant future, past, distant geographical area) leads to a high level processing of information. A strong proximity leads to a low-level information processing.
Since each type of processing can have its advantages depending on what we need to model, we can favor one type of representation over another by changing a frame of reference: e.g., imagining in the third person, anticipating a certain emotion in front of the action, creating novelty or familiarity, etc.
Switching from one construal to another might help to counter cognitive bias / help self control.
Whether in our private or professional lives, being aware of these levels of representation can optimize self-control/cooperation to emit behaviors that are in harmony with our values and goals. In a professional collaboration, it may be wise to create a division of labor where the more experienced individual models the possible concrete variables (low level), while the less experienced individual imagines the overall way to operate (high level). In the personal setting, as various examples have been noted, moving to a high level of representation can help self-control in the face of short-term temptations. Conversely, if the person is projecting too much and not taking enough action in the present, he or she can be encouraged to better model the concrete variables that could give him or her well-being in the short term. Indeed, it seems that balance is a way to protect oneself against distress and dysfunction on the scale of a lifetime. It is therefore not a question of favouring one mode of representation over another but of finding a balance between the two. The most appropriate modeling of reality is probably between the high and low levels of representation. It is therefore important to use both levels to create representations that are as close as possible to reality: the better our understanding of the world, the better our predictions of reality.